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where RSS1 and df1 are the residual sum of squares and the degrees of freedom of the simpler model, whereas RSS2 and df2 are the residual sum of squares and the degrees of freedom of the more complex model. The associated probability (p) can be computed as:

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where fcdf is the F cumulative distribution function65. If the resulting p-value was higher than the significance level (0.05), then the simpler model was likely to be correct. On the other hand, if the p-value was lower than the significance level, then the model with more parameters was likely to be correct. It should also be noted that the F-test can be used only with nested models (i.e., model A is nested in model B if parameters in model A are a subset of the parameters in model B). Comparisons between models with the same number of parameters (i.e., the same degrees of freedom) were performed using both the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) test and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). In this case the model with lower AIC and BIC is likely to be correct. Table 3 reports the lattice of models fitted to the performance values. All the possible pairs of models were compared without repetitions.

An additional analysis was performed in order to test whether parameter a differed between video gamers and between gamers and controls. In order to do this, the Restricted Model 4 was fitted separately to each dataset, but parameters b and c were fixed at 0.41 and 0.99, respectively. These values were taken from the previous global fit in which the same model (Restricted Model 4) was fitted to the three groups. Therefore, for the purpose of this analysis only the parameter a was free to vary and was constrained to assume values between 0 and 1.

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To betray is the dominant strategy for both players, meaning it is the player's best response in all circumstances, which aligns with the sure-thing principle.[3] The prisoner's dilemma also illustrates that the decisions made under collective rationality may not necessarily be the same as those made under individual rationality. This conflict is also evident in a situation called the "Tragedy of the Commons".[3]

It is assumed that both prisoners understand the nature of the game, have no loyalty to each other, and will have no opportunity for retribution or reward outside the game. Regardless of what the other decides, each prisoner gets a higher reward by betraying the other ("defecting"). The reasoning involves analyzing both players' best responses: B will either cooperate or defect. If B cooperates, A should defect, because going free is better than serving 2 years. If B defects, A should also defect, because serving 5 years is better than serving 10. So, either way, A should defect since defecting is A's best response regardless of B's strategy. Parallel reasoning will show that B should defect.

Tit-for-tat is a ZD strategy which is "fair" in the sense of not gaining advantage over the other player. However, the ZD space also contains strategies that, in the case of two players, can allow one player to unilaterally set the other player's score or alternatively, force an evolutionary player to achieve a payoff some percentage lower than his own. The extorted player could defect but would thereby hurt himself by getting a lower payoff. Thus, extortion solutions turn the iterated prisoner's dilemma into a sort of ultimatum game. Specifically, X is able to choose a strategy for which D ( P , Q , β S y + γ U ) = 0 \displaystyle D(P,Q,\beta S_y+\gamma U)=0 , unilaterally setting s y \displaystyle s_y to a specific value within a particular range of values, independent of Y's strategy, offering an opportunity for X to "extort" player Y (and vice versa). (It turns out that if X tries to set s x \displaystyle s_x to a particular value, the range of possibilities is much smaller, only consisting of complete cooperation or complete defection.[20])

Researchers from the University of Lausanne and the University of Edinburgh have suggested that the "Iterated Snowdrift Game" may more closely reflect real-world social situations. Although this model is actually a chicken game, it will be described here. In this model, the risk of being exploited through defection is lower, and individuals always gain from taking the cooperative choice. The snowdrift game imagines two drivers who are stuck on opposite sides of a snowdrift, each of whom is given the option of shoveling snow to clear a path or remaining in their car. A player's highest payoff comes from leaving the opponent to clear all the snow by themselves, but the opponent is still nominally rewarded for their work.

Endothelial cells (ECs) are a heterogeneous population that fulfills many physiological processes. ECs also actively participate in both innate and adaptive immune responses. ECs are one of the first cell types to detect foreign pathogens and endogenous metabolite-related danger signals in the bloodstream, in which ECs function as danger signal sensors. Treatment with lipopolysaccharide activates ECs, causing the production of pro-inflammatory cytokines and chemokines, which amplify the immune response by recruiting immune cells. Thus, ECs function as immune/inflammation effectors and immune cell mobilizers. ECs also induce cytokine production by immune cells, in which ECs function as immune regulators either by activating or suppressing immune cell function. In addition, under certain conditions, ECs can serve as antigen presenting cells (antigen presenters) by expressing both MHC I and II molecules and presenting endothelial antigens to T cells. These facts along with the new concept of endothelial plasticity suggest that ECs are dynamic cells that respond to extracellular environmental changes and play a meaningful role in immune system function. Based on these novel EC functions, we propose a new paradigm that ECs are conditional innate immune cells. This paradigm provides a novel insight into the functions of ECs in inflammatory/immune pathologies.

How to reference this article:How to reference this article:McLeod, S. A. (2020, May 01). Thomas kuhn - science as a paradigm. Simply Psychology. domainroot=""function Gsitesearch(curobj)curobj.q.value="site:"+domainroot+" "+curobj.qfront.value

Humanitarian aid has long been dominated by a classical, Dunantist paradigm that was based on the ethics of the humanitarian principles and centred on international humanitarian United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations. While in previous decades alternative paradigms and humanitarianisms evolved, this classical paradigm remained the central narrative of humanitarianism. In recent years, however, this paradigm has been paralleled by a resilience paradigm that is focused on local people and institutions as the first responders to crises. Whereas classical humanitarianism is rooted in the notion of exceptionalism, resilience humanitarianism starts from the idea of crisis as the new normality. This paper discusses the two paradigms and the incongruent images they evoke about crises, local institutions and the recipients of aid. The article puts forward the case for studying the ways in which these contrasting aid paradigms shape practices, dealing with the importance of discourse, the social life of policy, the multiplicity of interests, the power relations and the crucial importance of understanding the lifeworld and agency of aid workers and crisis-affected communities. The article demonstrates how the stories that humanitarians tell about themselves are based on highly selective views of reality and do not include the role they themselves play in the reordering and representation of realities in humanitarian crises.

Practices of aid are to some extent dictated by the needs and conditions imposed by the humanitarian crisis. However, as aidnographies consistently found, practices of aid are also shaped by the mandates of agencies, the way they give meaning to their work and the assumptions they have about the local context and the population they serve. This article, then, analyses the stories that aid tells about itself, namely the two paradigms of classic Dunantist humanitarian aid and the turn to resilience, and the assumptions that (implicitly or explicitly) underpin these stories.

Paradigms stand for a particular way of understanding crisis. Before discussing the two paradigms underpinning classical and resilience humanitarianism, this section provides a number of (cautious) notes about the working of paradigms.

Similarly, paradigms, policies and other ordering principles are never singular in driving practice. This can be exemplified by a note about interests. In my perspective, actors are always (self)-interested, but interests are rarely singular and consistent. Take the case of INGOs. A lot has been written about the instrumentalization of aid (Donini 2012), whereby aid is seen as the playball of politics. In this view, humanitarian action has little to do with its principles but is instrumentalized by competing and interested actors, including donors, national governments and rebel movements. In the case of INGOs, it has been suggested that the competition among these agencies leads to a tendency to go for the money and favour projects that are likely to raise funds (Bob 2005). There is abundant evidence, and many NGO workers will know from experience, that this is true in many ways.

Exceptionalism is at the heart of this classic paradigm, perhaps even more than the principles. A strict separation between crisis and normality is deeply engrained in legal and cultural norms worldwide. Humanitarian aid clearly belongs in the realm of crisis and exceptionality, serving as a temporary stop-gap for needs triggered by a specific crisis (Calhoun 2010). Exceptionalism is the major organizing principle of classic humanitarianism and is the backbone of many of the properties of aid including its short-cycle funding modalities and expensive operating procedures. As the system is organized for short-term, bounded operations, the definition of humanitarian crises follows the confines of the system, rather than the other way around. An intuitive definition of a humanitarian crisis is that the withdrawal of aid would lead to an immediate upsurge in mortality and morbidity. But what if this was turned around? Then a humanitarian crisis frame may also be applied to situations where delivery of cash relief would lead to an immediate reduction in mortality and morbidity. Would that not be the case in many areas where people live in slums or have unsafe access to drinking water? However, these types of crises are rarely framed as humanitarian. Definitions of humanitarian crisis are ring-fenced by being restricted to those situations (disasters triggered by natural hazards and conflicts) that the humanitarian machinery can hope to handle.


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